175 points
• 2 days ago
• Article
Link
当 Fisker Inc. 于 2024 年 6 月申请第 11 章破产时，大约 11,000 名 Ocean SUV 车主被留下来了——这些车售价在 40,000 到 70,000 美元之间，但正迅速失去维持其运行所需的软件功能。这家公司曾被视为特斯拉的竞争对手，拥有超过 31,000 个订单，潜在收入达 17 亿美元，但在负债超过 10 亿美元之前只生产了 11,000 辆车。问题出在架构上：Fisker 打造了 Cory Doctorow 所称的"软件定义汽车"，几乎每个子系统——从刹车和安全气囊到电池管理和车门锁——都需要定期连接 Fisker 的云端服务器。一旦这些服务器断联，车辆就会丧失关键功能，而不仅是娱乐系统。
随后发生的事情成为电动汽车史上最引人注目的案例之一。 Fisker Ocean 的车主们没有接受车辆将被废弃的命运，而是自发组建了 Fisker Owners Association（FOA），这个非营利组织迅速发展到约 4,000 名成员，既像汽车俱乐部，又像科技初创公司，甚至像一家独立汽车制造商。他们雇佣独立技术专家逆向分析 Fisker 的专有软件补丁，互相教授刷写固件的方法，组织替换零件的集中采购，通过团购把钥匙扣等关键配件的价格从约 1,000 美元大幅压低。在欧洲，他们还成立了"飞行医生"计划，技术熟练的成员前往帮助其他车主维修车辆。
这些技术工作进一步发展成真正的开源生态。在 GitHub 上，开发者 MichaelOE 逆向了 Fisker 官方移动应用的 API，构建了一个 Home Assistant 集成，把每个云 API 的值作为传感器暴露出来，该项目在 Apache 2.0 许可下已有 135 次提交和 20 个发布。社区成员发布了 Fisker Ocean 的 CAN 总线文件，包括用于过滤和处理的 DBC 文件，系统性地绘制了以 500 kbps 运行的多条 CAN 总线。 Majr Srour 记录了如何嗅探 CAN 流量并解码诊断故障码，目标是把诊断能力放进手机应用，让车主能自行扫描，而不再依赖已不存在厂家的经销商工具。
然而，社区的努力在 2024 年 10 月遭遇重大阻碍：Fisker 的剩余库存被卖给 American Lease，后者额外支付 250 万美元以获取 Fisker 专有源代码和云服务的访问权。 American Lease 通过与 FOA 的口头协议同意为私人 Ocean 车主延续联网服务，但双方并未签署正式合同。合作破裂发生在 American Lease 要求 FOA 承担 58% 的所有运营成本（包括 LTE 连接和 Microsoft Cloud 服务），却拒绝提供明细发票。后果是毁灭性的：车主失去了远程连接，云功能被削减，一项待执行的软件召回也被阻止。
Fisker Ocean 的遭遇并非个例。 Nikola 也申请破产，令其车主面临类似困境，Canoo 和 Arrival 则走向清算拍卖。分析师预计随着行业整合，会有更多电动汽车初创公司倒下。消费者维权人士正在推动结构性变革，包括设立强制性软件托管基金以在制造商消失时维持车辆软件运行、在破产程序中强制开源、以及强制共享维修数据。俄勒冈州的 Right to Repair 法案已经禁止使独立维修困难的"零件配对"，而大众、 BMW 和 Mercedes 等欧洲汽车厂商在 2025 年签署备忘录，共同开发一个开源的汽车软件平台。
问题不是是否会有更多电动汽车公司倒闭——这是不可避免的；问题是当它们倒闭时，是否已有机制能防止成千上万辆仍可使用的车辆变成电子垃圾。以太坊联合创始人 Vitalik Buterin 如此表述了这种担忧：汽车行业需要更多开源思维，令人悲哀的是"制造商一旦消失，汽车就变得无用"已经成了常态。 FOA 证明了一个有奉献精神的社区可以让被遗弃的电动汽车继续上路：逆向固件、绘制 CAN 总线、构建集成、运行移动维修服务。但车主不应被逼迫走这条路。行业需要强制性的软件托管和针对任何依赖云连接车辆的开源后备条款：如果制造商倒闭，软件应当向公众公开。下次有电动汽车初创公司倒闭时，车主不应再被迫变成黑客和零件中间人才能继续驾驶他们已经付钱购买的汽车。
When Fisker Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2024, it left roughly 11,000 Ocean SUV owners with vehicles that cost between $40,000 and $70,000 but were rapidly losing the software functionality that made them work. The company, once positioned as a Tesla rival with over 31,000 reservations worth $1.7 billion in potential revenue, had produced just 11,000 vehicles before collapsing under more than $1 billion in debt. The problem was architectural. Fisker had built what digital rights activist Cory Doctorow called a "software-based car," where virtually every subsystem, from brakes and airbags to battery management and door locks, needed periodic connections to Fisker's cloud servers. When those servers went dark, the cars lost critical functionality, not just infotainment features.
What happened next became one of the most remarkable stories in electric vehicle history. Instead of accepting that their cars would become useless, Fisker Ocean owners organized into the Fisker Owners Association, a nonprofit that quickly grew to 4,000 members and began operating as something between a car club, a tech startup, and an independent automaker. They hired independent tech experts to reverse-engineer Fisker's proprietary software patches, taught each other how to flash firmware, and organized bulk purchases of replacement parts, negotiating key fob prices down from roughly $1,000 each to a fraction of that through coordinated group buys. In Europe, they created a "Flying Doctors" program where technically skilled members travel to help other owners maintain their vehicles.
The technical work evolved into a genuine open-source ecosystem. On GitHub, developer MichaelOE reverse-engineered the API behind Fisker's official mobile app and built a Home Assistant integration that exposes every cloud API value as a sensor, with 135 commits and 20 releases under an Apache 2.0 license. Community members published CAN bus files for the Fisker Ocean, including DBC files for filtering and processing, systematically mapping the multiple CAN buses that run at 500kbps. Majr Srour documented how to sniff CAN traffic and decode Diagnostic Trouble Codes, aiming to put diagnostic capabilities into mobile apps so owners can run their own scans without relying on dealer tools that no longer exist for a defunct company.
The community's path hit a major obstacle in October 2024 when Fisker's remaining inventory was sold to American Lease, which spent an extra $2.5 million to acquire access to Fisker's proprietary source code and cloud services. American Lease agreed to extend connected services to private Ocean owners through a deal with the FOA, but the agreement was never formally signed, it was based on a handshake. The relationship collapsed when American Lease asked the FOA to cover 58% of all operational costs, including LTE connectivity and Microsoft Cloud services, while refusing to provide itemized invoices. The result was devastating: Ocean owners lost remote connectivity, cloud features were cut, and a pending software recall was blocked.
The Fisker Ocean saga is not an isolated incident. Nikola also filed for bankruptcy, leaving its owners in a similar situation, while Canoo and Arrival are headed for liquidation auctions. Analysts expect more EV startups to follow as the industry consolidates. Consumer advocates are now pushing for structural changes, including mandatory software escrow funds to keep vehicle software running even if the manufacturer disappears, open-source mandates in bankruptcy proceedings, and shared repair data requirements. Oregon's Right to Repair bill already bans the "parts pairing" that makes independent repair so difficult, and European automakers like Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz signed a memorandum in 2025 to develop a shared open-source automotive software platform.
The question isn't whether more EV companies will fail, it's inevitable. The question is whether systems will be in place to prevent tens of thousands of functional vehicles from becoming e-waste when they do. Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin captured the mood when he wrote that the auto industry needs much more open-source thinking, noting how sad it is that "if the manufacturer disappears, the car is useless now" has become a default. The Fisker Owners Association has proven that a dedicated community can keep orphaned EVs on the road, reverse-engineering firmware, mapping CAN buses, building integrations, and running mobile repair programs. But they shouldn't have had to. The industry needs mandatory software escrow and open-source fallback provisions for any vehicle that depends on cloud connectivity. If a manufacturer dies, the software should be released to the public. The next time an EV startup goes under, owners shouldn't need to become hackers and parts brokers just to keep driving the cars they already paid for.
65 comments • Comments Link
• Fisker 采用高度依赖云的汽车设计使其格外脆弱，但更广泛的问题是所有制造商都面临的软件依赖性——不仅仅是电动汽车——这需要像欧洲汽车制造商正在开发的开源汽车平台那样的系统性解决方案。
• 如果采用开源软件，Fisker 本可以被拯救：车主能够自行维护和更新车辆，即便公司倒闭也能维持一个可持续的生态系统。
• 文章的写作风格，尤其是如 "the irony reads" 之类的短语，被批评为 AI 生成的垃圾内容，这引发了关于 AI 在新闻业中作用的讨论，以及 AI 辅助内容是否还能算作优质新闻的争议。
• 刹车和转向等关键安全系统绝不应由仅有软件控制且没有机械后备——现实恐怖的例子表明，发动机熄火会让老旧车辆的刹车助力和转向助力失效。
• 现代汽车对软件和云连接的依赖带来了不可接受的风险，包括可能被强制进行空中下载更新，从而在未经车主同意的情况下改变车辆行为。
• Fisker 的困境凸显了一种反复出现的企业伤害客户的模式：这是 Fisker 第二次破产，车主再次被抛在一边，车辆失去支持。
• 对于车主能够控制和修改的软件可见车辆有着强烈需求，许多消费者愿意为避免企业监控和控制而支付溢价。
• 以 250 万美元收购 Fisker 源代码的租赁公司，主要是为了自身商业利益（租给 Uber 司机），而并非为了支持更广泛的车主社区。
• 现代车辆中不必要的软件激增导致了荒谬的复杂性和成本，例如记忆座椅这类功能需要多个电机并通过 CAN 总线集成，取代了简单的机械杠杆。
• AI 检测工具并不可靠，常产生误报——它们倾向于根据表面标记（比如 em dash 的使用）将人类撰写的内容误判为 AI 生成。
讨论揭示了汽车行业对软件与云连接日益依赖的深层担忧，Fisker 的倒闭成为软件依赖型车辆风险的警示故事。在主张更多开源解决方案以赋予车主控制权的人，与认为根本问题在于车辆中软件过多的人之间存在紧张。对话还触及 AI 在新闻业中的更广泛问题以及检测 AI 生成内容的挑战，参与者普遍对 AI 写作质量和 AI 检测工具的可靠性持怀疑态度。关于用软件控制关键系统的安全问题反复出现，参与者分享了亲身经历，强调从基本功能中移除机械后备的潜在危险。 • Fisker's cloud-dependent vehicle design made it uniquely vulnerable, but the broader issue of software-dependent cars affects all manufacturers, not just EVs, and requires systemic solutions like the open-source automotive platform being developed by European automakers.
• Open-source software could have saved Fisker by allowing owners to maintain and update their vehicles independently, creating a sustainable ecosystem even after the company's collapse.
• The article's writing style, particularly phrases like "the irony reads," has been criticized as AI-generated slop, raising questions about the role of AI in journalism and whether AI-assisted content can still be considered quality journalism.
• Critical safety systems like brakes and steering should never be software-controlled without mechanical fail-safes, as demonstrated by terrifying real-world experiences where engine shutdowns caused brake and steering assist failures in older vehicles.
• Modern cars' dependence on software and cloud connectivity creates unacceptable risks, including the potential for mandatory over-the-air updates that could change vehicle behavior without owner consent.
• The Fisker situation highlights a recurring pattern of companies burning customers, with this being the second time Fisker has gone bankrupt and left owners stranded with unsupported vehicles.
• There's significant demand for vehicles with open-source software that owners can control and modify, with many consumers willing to pay premium prices to avoid corporate surveillance and control.
• The leasing company that bought Fisker's source code for $2.5 million appears to have done so primarily to serve their own commercial interests (leasing to Uber drivers) rather than supporting the broader owner community.
• The proliferation of unnecessary software in modern vehicles has created absurd complexity and cost, with features like memory seats requiring multiple motors and CAN bus integration to replace simple mechanical levers.
• AI detection tools are unreliable and often produce false positives, as demonstrated by their tendency to flag human-written content as AI-generated based on superficial markers like em dash usage.
The discussion reveals deep concerns about the automotive industry's increasing reliance on software and cloud connectivity, with Fisker's collapse serving as a cautionary tale about the risks of software-dependent vehicles. There's a tension between those advocating for more open-source solutions to give owners control and those who believe the fundamental problem is too much software in vehicles altogether. The conversation also touches on broader issues of AI in journalism and the challenges of detecting AI-generated content, with participants expressing skepticism about both the quality of AI writing and the reliability of AI detection tools. Safety concerns about software-controlled critical systems emerge as a recurring theme, with participants sharing personal experiences that highlight the potential dangers of removing mechanical fail-safes from essential vehicle functions.