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在美国各地，人们开始自行对 Flock Safety 的监控摄像头采取行动。自 2025 年 4 月以来，至少有 25 台摄像头在五个州被毁，从 California 到 Virginia 不等。这些破坏并非统一组织发起，而是愤怒的居民对他们认为与联邦移民执法有关联的侵入性监控网络的即时反应。 Virginia 的一名男子 Jeffrey S. Sovern 在六个月内系统性地拆毁了 13 台摄像头，面临 25 项刑事指控；他公开了自己的动机，援引第四修正案，并希望此案能成为遏制侵入性监控的催化剂。
破坏方式各不相同。在 La Mesa，市议会在面对压倒性反对声浪仍投票保留摄像头后，Fletcher Parkway 上的两台摄像头数周后被发现损坏。在 Eugene 和 Springfield，六台摄像头被从杆上剪下，至少一台被喷漆，现场还留有一张写着"Hahaha get wrecked ya surveilling fucks."的纸条。在 Suffolk，Sovern 拆除了支杆并拔走了线路、电池和太阳能板。 Greenview 有两台摄像头被剪落，Lisbon, Connecticut 有一台被砸毁。这一做法出现在蓝州、红州、城市和郊区，呈跨地域蔓延之势。
Flock Safety 在大约 6000 个美国社区部署了其以 AI 为基础的摄像头，能够扫描每一辆经过车辆的车牌，公司估值约为 75 亿美元。表面上宣称是为了社区安全，但实际上这一监控网络会向联邦移民执法提供数据。数据显示，地方与州警察对联邦移民目的进行了超过 4000 次查询，其中包括明确标注为"ICE"、"ICE+ERO"和"ICE WARRANT"的搜索。仅在 Virginia，警方在 12 个月内就对 Flock 网络进行了近 3000 次与移民相关的搜索。在 Washington state，至少有八个执法机构开启了与 U.S. Border Patrol 直接共享其 Flock 网络的功能。甚至有一个 Texas 学区的摄像头被来自多个州的 30 个执法机构为了移民目的进行过查询。
公众的愤怒还因他们觉得反对无效而加剧。在 La Mesa，市议会就续签 Flock 合约举行了场面爆满的会议，绝大多数出席者反对，但议会仍投票通过。 San Diego 也出现类似情形：大量居民出席并反对 Flock，官员却批准继续合作。当选民感到他们的担忧被忽视时，一些人就不再通过官方渠道表达意见。城市开始隐瞒摄像头位置：Louisville 为保密 Flock 摄像头位置而提起诉讼，称公开坐标可能危及公共安全，但更明显的担忧似乎是防止被破坏。 Norfolk 在 2025 年 12 月败诉，被迫公开 Hampton Roads 地区 600 个摄像头的位置。
Flock 的回应并未平息争议。 CEO Garrett Langley（38 岁）曾宣称大规模监控可消除美国所有犯罪。公司对破坏事件的官方声明称"我们尊重并重视对我们技术的担忧与反馈，建立信任对我们很重要"。但在城市隐瞒摄像头位置、警方在没有搜查令的情况下发起 ICE 搜索、学校摄像头被远在数州之外的机构查询、以及议会在压倒性反对声中仍续约的现实下，建立信任显得困难。 Sovern 的案件在 Reddit 上几乎获得普遍支持；当陪审团的舆论将你视为民间英雄时，对检控方来说是个难题。
这类破坏可能会继续，因为引发冲突的因素并未消失。尽管 Flock 否认，ICE 相关的查询仍在进行；城市仍然忽视公众反对；摄像头在 6000 多个社区持续扩展；逮捕行为往往带来所谓的"殉道者"。与此同时，Amazon 已终止与 Flock 的 Ring 合作，已有 46 个城市正式拒绝 Flock 摄像头，包括 Austin 、 Eugene 、 Mountain View 、 Santa Cruz 和 Alameda County 。政治风向正在变化，但对一些人来说，官方渠道推进得太慢了。争论的核心并非仅仅是 Flock 这个品牌，而是它所代表的监控基础设施：不顾公众反对仍不断扩展、声称本地化却向联邦数据库输送数据、挂着社区安全的幌子却助长驱逐机制。眼下，有人正用钳子将这一观点表达出来。
Across the United States, people are taking matters into their own hands when it comes to Flock Safety surveillance cameras. Since April 2025, at least 25 cameras have been destroyed in five states, from California to Virginia. The destruction isn't coordinated, it's just angry residents responding to what they see as an intrusive surveillance network with ties to federal immigration enforcement. One Virginia man, Jeffrey S. Sovern, faces 25 criminal charges for systematically destroying 13 cameras over six months, and he's been open about his motivations, citing the Fourth Amendment and hoping his case becomes a catalyst for rolling back intrusive surveillance.
The destruction has taken various forms. In La Mesa, California, two cameras were found destroyed on Fletcher Parkway weeks after the city council voted to keep them despite overwhelming public opposition. In Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, six cameras were cut down from poles, at least one spray-painted, with a note left behind reading "Hahaha get wrecked ya surveilling fucks." In Suffolk, Virginia, Sovern dismantled mounting poles and removed wiring, batteries, and solar panels. Two cameras were cut down in Greenview, Illinois, and one was smashed in Lisbon, Connecticut. The pattern spans blue states, red states, cities, and suburbs.
Flock Safety operates in approximately 6,000 U.S. communities with AI-powered cameras scanning every license plate that passes, and the company is valued at $7.5 billion. While the pitch is neighborhood safety, the reality is a surveillance network that feeds into federal immigration enforcement. Data shows more than 4,000 lookups by local and state police were conducted for federal immigration purposes, including searches explicitly tagged "ICE," "ICE+ERO," and "ICE WARRANT." In Virginia alone, police performed nearly 3,000 immigration-related searches on the Flock network over 12 months. In Washington state, at least eight law enforcement agencies enabled direct sharing of their Flock networks with U.S. Border Patrol. One Texas school district had cameras searched by 30 law enforcement agencies from multiple states for immigration purposes.
The anger is compounded by the feeling that public opposition doesn't matter. In La Mesa, the city council held a packed meeting about continuing its Flock contract where the overwhelming majority opposed the cameras, but the council voted to keep them anyway. San Diego had the same dynamic, huge turnout against Flock at council meetings, yet officials approved continuation. When elected officials tell constituents their concerns don't matter, some people stop using official channels. Cities are now hiding camera locations, with Louisville suing to keep Flock camera locations secret, claiming releasing them could compromise public safety, though the real concern appears to be vandalism. Norfolk lost a lawsuit in December 2025 that forced disclosure of 600 camera locations in Hampton Roads.
Flock's response hasn't helped. CEO Garrett Langley, 38, has claimed that mass surveillance could eliminate all crime in America. The company's official statement about the destruction said they "respect and value concerns and feedback raised about our technology, and building trust is important to us." But building trust is difficult when cities hide camera locations, police run ICE searches without warrants, school cameras get searched by agencies three states away, and council meetings with overwhelming opposition end in contract renewals. Sovern's case has generated near-universal support on Reddit, and when your jury pool thinks you're a folk hero, that's a problem for prosecutors.
The destruction is likely to continue because the triggers remain in place. ICE searches continue despite Flock's denials, cities keep ignoring opposition, cameras keep expanding across 6,000 communities and growing, and arrests create martyrs. Meanwhile, Amazon already killed its Ring-Flock partnership, and 46 cities have formally rejected Flock cameras, including Austin, Eugene, Mountain View, Santa Cruz, and Alameda County. The political winds are shifting, but for some people, the official channels are too slow. This isn't really about Flock specifically, it's about what Flock represents: surveillance infrastructure that expands regardless of public opposition, claims to be local while feeding federal databases, and promises community safety while enabling deportation machinery. Right now, that argument is being made with vice grips.
312 comments • Comments Link
• 文章的前提出入值得商榷。"美国人正在砸毁 Flock 摄像头"暗示了一场全国性潮流，但事实是只有 25 台摄像头被摧毁，其中超过一半由同一人所为。仅宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡就有 850 多台同类摄像头，这样的破坏在统计上几乎可以忽略不计。
• 网络讨论存在确认偏误。关于监控越权的耸人叙事极易传播，即便现实基础有限，也能带动大量互动和扩散，而不论事实真伪。
• AI 检测工具本质上不可靠。现有系统的表现往往不如人意，甚至接近随机猜测；即便理论上能做到完美，对抗性训练也可能迅速让检测器失效。开发或部署此类工具会产生误报，损害合法作者利益。
• 财产破坏通常被归类为破坏公物而非暴力行为。针对无生命的监控设备与针对人的暴力有本质区别；但当财产本身成为压迫或大规模监控的工具时，采取行动在道德上仍有其正当性争议。
• 传统民主程序经常无法回应选民关切。多个城市在面对公众对监控合同的强烈反对时选择忽视，官员有时通过修改采购规则来规避投票要求，这种制度性失灵促使人们采取法外回应。
• Flock 摄像头代表的是企业化的监控基础设施，公众问责严重缺失。数据被商业化出售给第三方（包括 Palantir 和 ICE 等），在缺乏有意义监督和公众同意的情况下运作。监控私有化绕开了对政府权力的传统制衡。
• 解决犯罪根源应侧重于减少贫困而非增加监控。犯罪与贫困和不平等密切相关，监控往往只是把犯罪从被监控区域转移到边缘化社区，而不能解决根本问题。
• 除了直接破坏外，还有其他抵抗方式。用袋子遮挡摄像头、进行无线干扰，或将设备拆除后归还，都是风险较低且可实现类似目标的替代做法，能减少参与者的法律风险。
• 测速摄像头和自动车牌识别系统的安全效益有限。大多数行人死亡发生在设计不良、限速高的道路上，而不是在轻微超速的路段。许多监控基础设施更服务于创收或社会控制，而非真正的安全改善。
• 历史先例支持在合法渠道失败时采取公民不服从。美国革命中就包含对财产的破坏（如波士顿倾茶事件）和对当局的非法抵抗。尽管通过民主渠道参与更可取，但历史显示，当制度拒绝回应时，成功的变革常常伴随法外压力。
• 开源反监控可能推动监管行动。一个公开透明的摄像头网络，用于追踪警察和政府车辆，可能促使立法介入，尽管政府也可能通过将追踪官方车辆定为犯罪来回应。
总体而言，讨论揭示了公众对监控基础设施及其治理回应的深刻怀疑。参与者普遍认为 Flock 摄像头属于有问题的企业监控，但在如何抵制上存在分歧：有人主张将财产破坏视为正当的公民不服从，另一些人则倾向于通过法律或技术手段反制。由于该文具有 AI 生成的特征并将孤立事件误导性地框定为全国性趋势，其可信度受到了广泛质疑。许多参与者指出，民主程序屡次未能解决监控问题，导致合理的挫败感，但对于财产破坏是助力还是损害这一事业，意见仍不一致。整个对话最终凸显了安全、隐私、企业权力与民主问责之间的紧张关系：这些问题没有简单的解决方案。 • The article's premise is questionable. "Americans are smashing flock cameras" suggests a major national trend, but the data reveals only 25 cameras destroyed, with more than half attributed to a single individual. Harrisburg, PA alone has 850+ comparable cameras, making the described destruction statistically insignificant.
• Online discussion forums suffer from confirmation bias. Compelling narratives about surveillance overreach are highly shareable, even when the underlying reality is limited. This drives engagement metrics and widespread propagation, regardless of factual accuracy.
• AI detection tools are fundamentally unreliable. Current systems perform no better than random chance, and even a theoretically perfect detector would become worthless almost immediately through adversarial training. Attempting to build or deploy such tools creates false positives that harm legitimate writers.
• Property destruction is classified as vandalism rather than violence. Targeting inanimate surveillance equipment differs fundamentally from violence against persons. Moral justification exists when the property itself functions as an instrument of oppression or mass surveillance.
• Traditional democratic processes frequently fail to address constituent concerns. Multiple cities have ignored overwhelming public opposition to surveillance contracts, with officials sometimes circumventing voting requirements through procurement rule changes. This breakdown drives extra-legal responses.
• Flock cameras represent corporate surveillance infrastructure with minimal public accountability. Data is sold commercially to third parties including Palantir and ICE, operating without meaningful oversight or public consent. This privatization of surveillance bypasses traditional checks on government power.
• Poverty reduction, not surveillance, addresses root causes of crime. Crime correlates strongly with poverty and inequality, not merely the absence of cameras. Surveillance merely displaces crime from monitored areas to marginalized communities without addressing underlying conditions.
• Alternative resistance methods exist beyond destruction. Covering cameras with bags, wireless jamming, or dismantling and returning equipment whole represent lower-risk approaches that achieve similar goals while reducing legal exposure for participants.
• Speed cameras and ALPR systems have limited safety benefits. Most pedestrian deaths occur on poorly designed roads with high speed limits, not on roads with minor speeding issues. Surveillance infrastructure primarily serves revenue generation or social control rather than genuine safety improvements.
• Historical precedent supports civil disobedience when legal channels fail. The American Revolution itself involved destruction of property (Boston Tea Party) and illegal resistance to authority. Democratic participation is preferable, but history shows successful change often requires extra-legal pressure when institutions refuse to respond.
• Open-source counter-surveillance could force regulatory action. A public, transparent camera network that tracks police and government vehicles would create pressure for proper legislation, though governments would likely respond by criminalizing such tracking of official vehicles.
The discussion reveals deep skepticism about both surveillance infrastructure and institutional responses to public concern. Participants broadly agree that Flock cameras represent problematic corporate surveillance, but disagree about appropriate resistance methods, with some advocating property destruction as justified civil disobedience and others favoring legal or technological countermeasures. The article's credibility was widely questioned due to its AI-generated nature and misleading framing of isolated incidents as a national trend. Multiple participants noted that democratic processes have repeatedly failed to address surveillance concerns, creating legitimate frustration despite disagreement about whether property destruction helps or harms the cause. The conversation ultimately highlights tensions between security, privacy, corporate power, and democratic accountability that lack easy resolution.