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理论物理学家 Carlo Rovelli 认为，所谓的"意识难题"是建立在过时二元论之上的伪问题。他指出，每当科学观念挑战人类自我形象，文化上就会出现抵触——从达尔文的进化论到当下关于意识的争论，例子屡见不鲜。 Rovelli 认为，理解意识之所以困难，并非因为它是超自然的，而是因为它是一种极其复杂的自然现象，类似雷暴或蛋白质折叠。他强调，更新我们对某种现象的认识并不会使其显得虚幻，就像把日落理解为 Earth 自转的结果并不会削弱它的美感一样。

Rovelli 直接质疑哲学家 David Chalmers 的框架：Chalmers 将解释大脑行为的"简单"问题与解释为何这些行为伴随主观体验的"困难"问题区分开来。 Rovelli 认为，所谓大脑过程与体验之间存在"解释鸿沟"的说法荒谬——它预设了在我们尚未理解某事时，就已知道理解它会是什么样子。他指出，这一想法之所以流行，是因为它维护了精神与自然分离的世界观，而 Spinoza 数百年前就预见并否定了这种看法。在 Rovelli 看来，不愿把意识视为自然的一部分，是反对科学进步的又一意识形态守旧。

Rovelli 的核心论点之一是：科学理解并非脱离经验，它本身就是关于经验的。他反对把科学当作一种从外部旁观世界的绝对客观叙述，强调我们正是所描述世界的一部分。我们的知识和理论是驾驭现实的工具，而不是某种"无处视角"的超然陈述。因此，第一人称的体验与第三人称的科学描述，仅是对同一大脑现象的不同视角。主观性并不神秘，它不过是一种特殊的视角；那种貌似"形而上学的鸿沟"，源自把科学模型误当成对终极实在的直接描写。

他还批评了 Chalmers 的"哲学僵尸"思想实验：一个行为上与人类完全相同却没有意识的存在。 Rovelli 认为，这是一种修辞手法，本身就预设了其试图证明的非物质意识。如果一个僵尸也会像我们一样通过内省确信自己有意识，那么该论证便自相矛盾。所谓僵尸只有在那些先入为主地假定存在形而上学鸿沟的人看来才有区别，这使得这一例子既难以令人信服，又更像对超验灵魂的怀旧，而非严密的论证。

Rovelli 最终断言，我们的心理生活与宇宙中其他现象在本质上是相同的。他认为，"意识""经验"只是发生在我们内部的事件的名称，原则上可以被外部观察者描述。心灵是用高级语言描述的大脑行为；第一人称和第三人称的视角都没有优先性，它们只是对同一事件的两种观察方式。他呼吁放弃意识讨论中有害的二元论，接受我们的灵魂与精神生活并不与基础物理学相悖——正如我们已经接受 Earth 与苍穹并无本质区别，人与其他动物也并无本质差异。 Carlo Rovelli, a theoretical physicist, argues that the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" is a false problem rooted in outdated dualistic thinking. He traces a historical pattern of cultural resistance to scientific ideas that challenge human self-image, from Darwin's theory of evolution to the current debate on consciousness. Rovelli suggests that the difficulty in understanding consciousness stems not from it being a supernatural phenomenon, but from it being an exceptionally complex natural one, much like thunderstorms or protein folding. He emphasizes that updating our understanding of a phenomenon does not make it illusory, just as understanding sunsets as a result of Earth's rotation does not diminish their beauty.

Rovelli directly challenges the framework introduced by philosopher David Chalmers, who distinguished between the "easy" problem of explaining brain behavior and the "hard" problem of explaining why such behavior is accompanied by subjective experience. Rovelli finds the concept of an "explanatory gap" between brain processes and experience to be nonsensical, as it presupposes knowledge of what we would understand if we currently understood something we do not. He argues that this idea is widely embraced because it preserves a worldview where spirit and nature are separate, a notion anticipated and rejected by Spinoza centuries ago. For Rovelli, the resistance to seeing consciousness as part of nature is the latest in a long line of ideological rearguard battles against scientific progress.

A core part of Rovelli's argument is that scientific understanding is not separate from experience but is entirely about it. He rejects the naive view of science as an objective account of the world observed from the outside, stating that we are part of the world we seek to describe. Our knowledge and theories are embodied tools for navigating reality, not disembodied views from nowhere. Therefore, the dualism between a first-person experience and a third-person scientific account is simply a difference in perspective on the same brain phenomenon. Subjectivity is not mysterious but a special case of a perspective, and the apparent "metaphysical gap" arises from mistaking our scientific models for direct accounts of an ultimate reality.

Rovelli also critiques Chalmers' thought experiment of the "philosophical zombie," a being that behaves identically to a human but lacks consciousness. He argues this is a rhetorical trick that assumes the very non-physical consciousness it seeks to prove. If a zombie would be convinced of its own consciousness through introspection, just as we are, then the argument becomes self-defeating. The zombie is only distinguishable by those who already assume a metaphysical gap, making it an unconvincing example that reflects nostalgia for a transcendent soul rather than a logical proof.

Ultimately, Rovelli asserts that our mental life is of the same nature as any other phenomenon in the universe. He posits that "consciousness" and "experience" are names for events that happen inside us, which could, in principle, be described by an external observer. The mind is the behavior of the brain described in a high-level language, and neither the first-person nor the third-person perspective is primary; they are two views on the same events. He encourages us to abandon the pernicious dualism of the consciousness debate and embrace the reality that our soul, or spiritual life, is consistent with our fundamental physics, just as we have accepted that Earth is not different from the heavens, or humans from other animals.