NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
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National Transportation Safety Board 已发布对 2026 年 9 月 6 日在 Miami International Airport 发生的 21 Air Flight 7598（一架 Boeing 767-33A 货机）跑道冲出事故的初步调查更新。调查人员已成功回收并分析了驾驶舱语音记录器和飞行数据记录器的数据。回收的飞行数据约 54 小时，包含 400 多个参数；语音记录为四通道、两小时的高质量音频。
语音记录显示，机组在开始放襟翼并放下起落架后不久，获准在 30 号跑道着陆。进近过程中，驾驶舱对飞机速度表示担忧。录音结束前约 1 分 42 秒，一名飞行员提醒另一名飞行员速度过快。此后在剩余的飞行时间里，录音中反复出现对速度过高的评论，但另一名飞行员并未持续做出口头回应。
在下降末段，飞机触发了多项自动电子警告，包括下沉率警告和低地形警报。尽管出现这些警告，着陆程序仍继续。机头和右主起落架在地速 158 节时首次接地，随后机组尝试复飞。在语音记录结束前约 15 秒，一名飞行员宣布复飞并增大了油门。
飞行数据记录显示，复飞尝试时间很短。发起机动后约 4 秒内，油门被回至怠速并重新踩下刹车。随后飞机以约 117 节的地速偏离了铺装路面。对飞行数据的进一步分析表明，在此次过程中，速度板和反推装置均未部署。调查仍在进行中，相关人员将继续审查证据并整理驾驶舱通话的正式文字记录。
The National Transportation Safety Board has released a preliminary update regarding its ongoing investigation into the September 6, 2026, runway excursion involving 21 Air Flight 7598, a Boeing 767-33A cargo aircraft, at Miami International Airport. Investigators have successfully recovered and analyzed data from both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. The recovered flight data spans approximately 54 hours and includes over 400 parameters, while the voice recording provides two hours of high-quality audio across four channels.
According to the voice recorder data, the flight crew received clearance to land on runway 30 shortly after they began configuring the aircraft with flaps and landing gear. As the approach continued, concerns regarding the aircraft's speed were noted in the cockpit. Approximately 1 minute and 42 seconds before the recording ended, one pilot alerted the other that they were traveling too fast. While the cockpit recording captured repeated comments about this excessive speed for the remainder of the flight, there was no consistent verbal response from the other pilot.
During the final stages of the descent, the aircraft triggered several automated electronic warnings, including alerts for sink rate and low terrain. Despite these warnings, the landing sequence proceeded. Following the initial touchdown of the nose and right main gear at a groundspeed of 158 knots, the flight crew attempted a go-around maneuver. Approximately 15 seconds before the end of the voice recording, a pilot called for this procedure, and throttle settings were increased.
Data from the flight recorder shows that the go-around attempt was brief. Within four seconds of initiating the maneuver, the throttles were reduced to idle and the brakes were re-applied. The aircraft subsequently departed the paved surface at a groundspeed of 117 knots. Further analysis of the flight recorder data indicates that neither the speed brakes nor the thrust reversers were deployed during this sequence. The investigation remains active as officials continue to review the evidence and prepare a formal transcript of the cockpit communications.
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一架 B767 货机在 Miami 附近发生事故，表现为一系列飞行技术和决策上的严重失误。最明显的问题是：尽管进近明显不稳定，机组仍拒绝执行强制复飞（go-around）。
机组未能达到安全着陆的既定标准，包括速度过快、襟翼配置错误、未能保持正确的下滑道（glideslope），并在多次警告下继续进近。旨在授权下属质疑上级并在紧急情况下接管驾驶的 Crew Resource Management（CRM）原则在该驾驶舱内被忽视或失效。
过高的空速和在地面效应（ground effect）中产生的"浮动"导致主起落架未受压，阻止了自动扰流板（automatic spoilers）和刹车等关键安全系统的激活，从而大大增加了减速难度。最后几秒钟内虽尝试发起复飞，但随后又中止，导致灾难性的跑道偏出（runway excursion）；专家指出，在放弃复飞前，发动机没有足够时间加速到全推力。
专业共识认为，这起事故反映的是基本飞行纪律和情境意识（situational awareness）的全面失败，而非对机型不熟悉所致。事故也引发了关于企业压力是否会促使飞行员把燃油效率或准点率放在安全之前的讨论，尽管业内人士坚持安全应始终优先。
FAA 的监管和 NTSB 的调查等制度性框架用于追究航空公司与机组责任，以防止"偏差常态化"（normalization of deviance）。自动化驾驶舱系统和强制复飞阈值本意在预防此类后果，但自负、疲劳以及"急于到达目的地"（get-there-itis）等因素仍构成重大风险。航空专家强调，复飞是标准且无惩罚性的程序，只要进近不稳定，无论军衔或可能造成的延误，都应立即执行。
航空界普遍认为，此次事故是飞行技能的彻底失败，由一系列在飞机尚未接近跑道前就已开始的鲁莽决策推动。与其归咎于对机型的不熟悉，不如把焦点放在忽视稳定进近标准（stabilized approach criteria）及在下属未能质疑机长危险行为的驾驶舱文化中潜在的灾难性后果。尽管关于企业影响或疲劳的推测存在，但主要共识是：机组拒绝执行复飞——这一基本且被普遍接受的操作——是导致这场悲剧的核心因素。 • A B767 cargo aircraft accident near Miami was characterized by a series of critical errors in airmanship and decision-making, most notably the refusal to perform a mandatory go-around despite an unstabilized approach.
• The flight crew failed to meet established criteria for a safe landing, including excessive speed, incorrect flap configuration, and failing to maintain a proper glideslope, yet continued the approach despite multiple warnings.
• Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles, which are designed to empower subordinates to challenge superiors and take control during emergencies, were ignored or proved ineffective in this cockpit.
• The lack of weight on the main landing gear, caused by excessive airspeed and "floating" in ground effect, prevented the activation of critical safety systems like automatic spoilers and brakes, significantly complicating the attempted deceleration.
• An attempt to initiate a go-around in the final seconds was aborted shortly after, leading to a catastrophic runway excursion; experts suggest the engines lacked the time to spool up to full thrust before the attempt was abandoned.
• The professional consensus suggests this was a failure of basic aviation discipline and situational awareness rather than a lack of familiarity with the specific aircraft type.
• The incident has sparked debate regarding the potential for corporate pressure on pilots to prioritize fuel efficiency or on-time performance, though industry professionals maintain that safety should always supersede such considerations.
• Regulatory frameworks like the FAA's oversight and NTSB investigations exist specifically to hold carriers and crews accountable, ensuring that patterns of "normalization of deviance" do not go unchecked.
• Automated cockpit systems and mandatory go-around thresholds are designed to prevent such outcomes, yet human factors like ego, fatigue, and "get-there-itis" remain significant risks.
• Aviation experts emphasize that a go-around is a standard, non-punitive procedure that should be executed immediately whenever an approach becomes unstable, regardless of rank or potential delays.
The consensus among aviation professionals identifies this accident as a complete failure of airmanship, driven by a series of reckless decisions that began long before the plane reached the runway. Rather than an issue of equipment familiarity, the crash illustrates the dangers of ignoring stabilized approach criteria and the catastrophic potential of a cockpit environment where the subordinate pilot fails to challenge a captain's dangerous actions. While speculation exists regarding the potential for corporate influence or fatigue, the primary consensus is that the crew's refusal to perform a go-around—a fundamental and universally practiced maneuver—stands as the core driver of the tragedy.