Registration without a phone number on Signal will use zero-knowledge proofs
围绕 Signal 无需电话号码注册的社区讨论凸显了显著的技术进展，以及用户对提升平台隐私性的持续关注。 Android 应用代码库的最新变化指向了新登录界面和注册模块的实现，这些模块允许用户设置用户名，反映出在用户验证方式上从基于电话的标识向依赖更先进密码学原理的方法演进。
这些增强隐私的功能核心是零知识证明（ZKP），它使服务器在不查看或存储实际底层数据的情况下，验证诸如用户名长度或字符集等特定凭据。社区贡献者指出，这项技术已被集成到 Signal 生态的多个环节中，包括群组成员资格和捐赠验证。通过采用零知识证明，Signal 保持客户端设计上对服务器的不信任，从而在服务器可能面临外部法律压力时仍维持高标准的安全性。
尽管部分用户对首次订阅流程中可能存在的漏洞或遭传票索取的元数据表示担忧，但整体上社区对 Signal 底层架构抱有信心。支持者认为，无需电话号码即可注册是将用户身份与个人信息脱钩目标的自然延伸，这一转变被视为让平台对更广泛用户更易访问、更安全的重要里程碑。
开发人员和工作人员一直积极参与相关工作，Android 代码仓库的近期提交就是例证。这些技术更新，包括新增的登录文本和注册流程的基础框架，表明该功能在开发周期中稳步推进。随着社区跟踪这些 GitHub 提交并评估测试版反馈，关注点仍集中在确保新注册方法的稳健性、透明性，以及与 Signal "隐私优先"通信理念的一致性。
The community discussions surrounding registration without a phone number on Signal highlight significant technical progress and ongoing user interest in enhancing platform privacy. Recent developments in the Android application's codebase point toward the implementation of a new login screen and registration modules that allow users to set usernames. These updates reflect the application's evolving approach to user verification, moving toward methods that rely on advanced cryptographic principles rather than traditional phone-based identifiers.
At the heart of these privacy-enhancing features are zero-knowledge proofs, or ZKPs, which enable the server to verify specific user credentials, such as username length or character set constraints, without ever seeing or storing the actual underlying data. Community contributors emphasize that this technology is already integrated into various parts of the Signal ecosystem, including group membership and donation verification. By leveraging ZKPs, Signal ensures that the client remains designed to distrust the server, thereby maintaining high security standards even in scenarios where the server might be subject to external legal pressure.
While some users express initial skepticism regarding potential vulnerabilities during the first subscription process or concerns about subpoenaed metadata, the prevailing sentiment is one of confidence in Signal's underlying architecture. Supporters of these changes point out that the ability to register without a phone number is a natural extension of the project's goal to decouple user identity from personal information. This transition is seen as a major milestone in making the platform more accessible and secure for a wider range of users.
Developers and staff have been actively contributing to this effort, as evidenced by recent commits to the Android repository. These technical updates, including the addition of new login strings and scaffolding for the registration flow, suggest that the feature is moving steadily through the development lifecycle. As the community tracks these GitHub commits and evaluates the beta feedback, the focus remains on ensuring that these new registration methods remain robust, transparent, and aligned with Signal's core philosophy of privacy-first communication.
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• Signal Android 的最新发布周期更新现已允许 Android 平板作为一等已关联辅助设备运行——这一功能此前要么不可用，要么未被清晰告知用户。
• 批评者认为 Signal 应公开其基础设施自动化代码，指出后端管理透明化有助于建立更大的社区信任，并在服务受损时更容易恢复。
• 在联邦化（federation）问题上存在根本分歧：官方政策称联邦化会令技术僵化，而 XMPP 和 Matrix 等协议的倡导者则认为标准化能确保互操作性、避免中心化傲慢，并使消息传递具备面向未来的适应性。
• 人们持续担忧 Signal 对 Amazon Web Services 的依赖及其在美国的法人结构，认为这些因素可能与应用宣称的防范国家级监控的隐私承诺存在冲突。
• 将 Google Play Billing 纳入账户注册引发强烈反弹，用户呼吁支持 Monero 等去中心化、匿名的支付方式以避免被迫绑定到 Google 生态系统。
• 元数据仍是主要的安全隐忧：即便消息端到端加密，也无法从根本上对网络层的观察者隐藏参与方身份、联系频率或通信时间戳。
• 零知识证明（ZKPs）的使用常被质疑，怀疑者警告该术语容易被当作营销噱头而非可验证的加密实现，因此需要访问源代码来确认实际安全性。
• 一些用户对"隐私"技术持怀疑态度，暗示知名项目可能被国家行为体收编或资助，这促使其他人强调应以威胁建模为核心，而不是对任何单一服务盲目信任。
• Molly（一个加强安全的 Signal 分叉）和 SimpleX（通过洋葱路由保护元数据）等替代方案被讨论为希望尽量减少对 Google 服务依赖并修补架构弱点的高级用户提供的解决路径。
• 关于硬件安全性的争论，尤其是 Google Pixel 上运行 GrapheneOS 的优点与 Titan 等专有硬件安全芯片不透明性之间的对比，凸显了利用现代硬件能力与保持对设备堆栈绝对控制之间的紧张关系。
这场讨论反映出主流隐私工具带来的便利，与追求去中心化和完全透明化的意识形态之间的深刻张力。尽管许多用户赞赏 Signal 生态的实际改进，但对其依赖中心化云基础设施、专有硬件组件以及与大型科技公司关联的质疑依然存在。参与者常就"完美"安全是否可得、或是否应将重点放在根据个人威胁模型和特定对抗能力来评估工具上发生分歧。归根结底，这场对话强调，对于注重隐私的用户而言，技术实现与提供软件的组织所处的政治与结构性现实不可分割。 • Recent updates to the Signal Android release cycle now permit Android tablets to function as first-class, linked adjunct devices, a feature that was previously unavailable or poorly communicated to users.
• Critics argue that Signal should release its infrastructure automation code, noting that transparency regarding backend management would allow for greater community trust and easier recovery if the service were compromised.
• A fundamental disagreement exists regarding federation, with official Signal policy asserting that it freezes technology, while advocates for protocols like XMPP and Matrix argue that standardization ensures interoperability, avoids centralized hubris, and future-proofs messaging.
• Concerns persist regarding Signal's reliance on Amazon Web Services and its US-based corporate structure, leading some to argue that these factors conflict with the app's claims of providing privacy against state-level surveillance.
• The addition of Google Play Billing for account registration has prompted significant backlash, with users calling for decentralized, anonymous payment methods like Monero to avoid forced association with Google's ecosystem.
• Metadata remains a primary security concern, as even end-to-end encrypted messaging cannot inherently hide the identities of participants, their contact frequency, or the timestamps of their communications from network-level observers.
• The use of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) is frequently debated, with skeptics warning that the term is often used as a marketing buzzword rather than a verifiable cryptographic implementation, necessitating source code access to confirm actual security.
• Some users maintain a cynical view of "privacy" tech, suggesting that high-profile projects may be co-opted or funded by state actors, leading others to emphasize the importance of threat modeling rather than relying on binary trust in any single service.
• Alternatives like Molly, a security-hardened Signal fork, and SimpleX, which uses onion routing for metadata protection, are discussed as solutions for power users who seek to minimize reliance on Google services and address inherent architectural weaknesses.
• Debate over hardware security—specifically the merits of GrapheneOS on Google Pixel devices versus the opaque nature of proprietary hardware security chips like the Titan module—highlights the tension between utilizing modern hardware and maintaining absolute control over the device stack.
The discussion reflects a deep tension between the convenience of mainstream privacy tools and the ideological desire for decentralization and full transparency. While many users appreciate the practical improvements to the Signal ecosystem, there is persistent skepticism regarding the project's reliance on centralized cloud infrastructure, proprietary hardware components, and ties to major tech conglomerates. Participants frequently clash over whether "perfect" security is attainable or if the focus should remain on evaluating tools based on individual threat models and specific adversary capabilities. Ultimately, the conversation underscores that for privacy-conscious users, technical implementation is inseparable from the political and structural realities of the organizations providing the software.